Indiana Supreme Court Determines Scope of Church Premises Liability Protection
A recent Indiana Supreme Court decision explains the broad statutory protection given to churches facing a premises liability claim. In Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch, 215 N.E.3d 1056 (Ind. 2025), a board member of the church, Gerard Kirsch, was injured while constructing the roof of a storage barn next to the church’s parking lot. While on a 10-foot ladder, Kirsch felt the ladder wobble, leading him to jump down and land on the sharp edge of a metal sheet. He sustained a deep cut to his arm that resulted in ongoing numbness in the injured arm and hand.
Kirsch claimed that the church failed to provide a ladder and other equipment in “safe and in working order;” “properly supervise” him; and failed to prevent him from building the shed “without proper equipment, training, and supervision.” In response to the claims, the church argued that it was not liable to Kirsch due to protections under Indiana Code § 34-31-7-2. The law specifically protects “nonprofit religious organizations,” by narrowing the duties a church owes to individuals that enter its premises. I.C. § 34-31-7-2 requires only that a church warn invitees, like Kirsch, of known hidden dangers and refrain from intentional harm.
Kirsch argued that because the injury occurred on a portion of the church’s premises not “used primarily for worship services” the statute did not apply; and therefore, the church owed him a heightened duty for premises liability—the duty of reasonable care. The trial court and court of appeals agreed with Kirsch, finding that the storage barn not used for worship services was outside of the statutory intent. The church appealed.
By analyzing the question of whether the incident occurred on the church’s premises “use[d] primarily for worship services,” the Indiana Supreme Court determined that “use” meant that “the premises as a whole be used primarily for worship services.” Instead of looking at each portion of the premises for specific uses, the Court assessed the aggregate primary use of the entire premises. Comparing the church premises to a chessboard, the Court reasoned that some squares do not contain chess pieces during the game, yet the chess board is still “primarily” being used for chess. The Court determined the statute applied and reversed the lower court decisions.
This decision clarifies the statutory protection of nonprofit religious organizations from premises liability claims. Those who are injured anywhere on a premises which “as a whole” is “used primarily for worship services” may be prevented from recovering damages.
*The author thanks Summer Legal Clerk Garrett Brewster for his helpful research and drafting assistance.